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ANOTHER APPROACH TO RACIAL
PREFERENCES*
STEVENE. EHLMANN**
I. INTRODUCTION: "AFFIRMATIVE ACTION" VS. "RACIAL
PREFERENCE"
As the debate on "affirmative action" continues, its proponents
have already won an important victory: the labeling of the term itself.
The use of the term "affirmative action" in the context of modem
political debate is flawed, for the modem discussion is not truly about
affirmative action, but rather about racial preference. Labeling racial
quotas, preferences, and set asides under the more general and less
threatening term "affirmative action" is akin to the press labeling
hard-line communists in the final days of the Soviet Union as
"conservatives," or a politician labeling a decrease in the rate of
growth of a federal spending program as a "cut."' These are all
simply misnomers designed to mislead the public as to their
proponents' true purpose.
* This Article was submitted for publication in April 1998, before the Missouri
Legislature adjourned. Senate Bill 681 did not make it to the senate floor for debate. The author
intends to resubmit the Bill in the legislative session beginning in January 1999.
** Missouri State Senator. B.A. 1973, Furman University; M.A. 1975, University of
Missouri-Columbia; J.D. 1985, Washington University. The author is in his sixth year in the
Missouri Senate and serves as Republican Floor Leader. He is a practicing attorney with the
firm of Pelikan, Ehlmann and Guinness, P.C. The author thanks his legislative aide, Scott
Buehler, for his research assistance.
1. See Steven E. Ehlmann, Both Sides, MISSOURI IMPACT MAGAZINE, May 6, 1996, at
34.
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Politically, whoever wins the battle over labels will ultimately win
the war on the underlying issue concerning racial preference.2 Polling
seems to show that a majority of Americans are not opposed to
affirmative action when it involves offering a helping hand to certain
minorities that have historically been the victims of discrimination.
3
As journalist Clarence Page has suggested, "Affirmative action, 'in
the best sense,' then, is outreach, not preferences." 4 It is what Abigail
Themstrom has called a "widening of the net,"5 not quotas or
separate standards for women and minorities.
6
However, when the helping hand turns into a preference, and less
is expected from someone simply because of his or her minority
group status, the majority of Americans are opposed to affirmative
action.7 As General Colin Powell wrote in his book, My American
Journey, "If affirmative action means programs that provide equal
opportunity, then I am for it. If it leads to preferential treatment or
helps those who no longer need help, I am opposed. I benefited from
equal opportunity and affirmative action in the Army, but I was not
shown preference."
8
Similarly, President Clinton appreciated the difference between
outreach and preferences when he spoke in opposition to California's
Proposition 209 during the 1996 presidential campaign.9 President
2. A recent vote on whether to end "affirmative action" in the city of Houston, Texas
most likely failed because the Mayor and members of the City Council, who opposed the effort
to end the program, rephrased as "affirmative action" all relevant legislative references to
"preferences." See Clarence Page, Voters Say Yes To Affirmative Action, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Nov. 18, 1997, at B7.
3. See Executive Decision Results, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY (visited Apr. 16, 1998)
<http:l/www.theatlantic.comleectionlconnectionldecision/960924.html>; Sara Raley,
Affirmative Action Poll Results Stun (visited Apr. 16, 1998) <http:llwww.californiaaggie.com/
archive/96/04/30/aff.action.html>; What The Public Says, NATIONAL ISSUES FORUMS (visited
Apr. 16, 1998) <http://www.nifi.org/newsletterspubsays.html>.




7. See What The Public Says, supra note 3; Affirmative Action Poll, supra note 3;
Executive Decision Results, supra note 3; Sara Raley, supra note 3.
8. COLINPOWELLWITHJOSEPHE. PERSiCO, MY AMERICAN JOURNEY 608 (1995).
9. The following language was adopted by the people of California as Proposition 209 in
November of 1996:
Section 31 is added to Article I of the California Constitution as follows:
[Vol. 54:93
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Clinton suggested that we "mend," not "end" affirmative action.10 It
is now two years since the President's re-election, and neither he nor
the Democratic-controlled legislature of Missouri has made any effort
to mend any aspect of racial preferences."
SEC. 3 1. (a) The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to,
any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in
the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.
(b) This section shall apply only to action taken after the section's effective date.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prohibiting bona fide qualifications
based on sex which are reasonably necessary to the normal operation of public
employment, public education, or public contracting.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as invalidating any court order or
consent decree which is in force as of the effective date of this section.
(e) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prohibiting action which must be
taken to establish or maintain eligibility for any federal program where ineligibility
would result in a loss of federal funds to the state.
(f) For the purposes of this section, "state" shall include, but not necessarily be
limited to, the state itself, any city, county, city and county, public university system,
including the University of California, community college district, school district,
special district, or any other political subdivision or governmental instrumentality of or
within the state.
(g) The remedies available for violations of this section shall be the same, regardless
of the injured party's race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin, as are otherwise
available for violations of then-existing California antidiscrimination law.
(h) This section shall be self-executing. If any part or parts of this section are found
to be in conflict with federal law or the United States Constitution, the section shall be
implemented to the maximum extent that federal law and the United States
Constitution permit. Any provision held invalid shall be severable from the remaining
portions of this section.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31 (adopted 1996). On November 3, 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court
refused to hear the case challenging Proposition 209, thus affirming the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's decision of April, 1997, to uphold the constitutionality of the
new law. See Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
10. Harriet Woods, Bill Clinton-Find Common Ground And Move Forward, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 20, 1996, at B3.
11. In 1997, a Missouri state senator, Peter Kinder (R-Cape Girardeau), filed Missouri
Senate Joint Resolution No. 3 which proposed a constitutional amendment concerning this
issue Had it been passed by the Missouri state legislature, this Resolution would have
prohibited discrimination or preferential treatment of persons on the basis of race, sex, color,
ethnicity or national origin in public employment, education and contracting. The Resolution
did not have the necessary support and remained in the Senate Judiciary Committee throughout
the session.
In October of 1997, Ward Connerly, a sponsor of California's Proposition 209, visited St.
Louis and spoke at St. Louis University. He expressed his belief that no Democrat-controlled
legislature in this country would put language similar to Proposition 209 on the ballot. Ward
Connerly, Speech at St. Louis University (Oct. 16, 1997). Therefore, if a change is to occur, it
must be by initiative petition of the people.
1998]
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II. MISSOURI SENATE BILL 681 AS A MEANS OF ENDING PURE
RACIAL PREFERENCE WHILE SUSTAINING TRUE
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Missouri Senate Bill 681,12 filed in January of 1998, would
remove racial preferences from the Missouri state statutes while
leaving affirmative action programs in place. If the Bill accomplishes
nothing else, it may at least make people aware of the distinction
between affirmative action and racial preferences. The Bill seeks to
affect only preferential treatment for public employment, educational
opportunities, and public contracting with the state of Missouri and
any of its political subdivisions, including public universities.' 3 The
Bill seeks to retain all traditional affirmative action measures now in
the statutes, including aggressive programs that assist minority
businesses in competing for state contracts.1
4
Senate Bill 681 declares null and void any law, executive order,
policy or rule that uses race, sex, color, ethnicity or national origin as
a criterion for either discriminating against or granting preferential
treatment to any individual or group of persons.' 5 The Bill allows for
the reenactment of preferences if the state can show by clear and
12. S. 681, 89th Mo. Leg., 2nd Sess. (1998). The Author of this Article is the sponsor of
the Bill.
13. See id.
14. See id.; Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 33.752, 33.756 (1994) (deleting the references to
preferences and the sections requiring an implementation plan of hiring by the Minority
Business Development Commission); Mo. REV. STAT. § 67.653 (1994) (deleting references to
a minimum level of minority business participation at the St. Louis Convention and Sports
Complex Authority); MO. REV. STAT. § 70.379 (1994) (omitting the requirement of a minimum
level of minority business participation in the Bi-State Transportation Authority); Mo. REV.
STAT. §§ 92.418, 92.421 (deleting references to a minimum level of minority business
participation in the Kansas City Public Transit System); Mo. REV. STAT. § 166.203 (1994)
(omitting the requirement that at least one director of the Missouri Higher Education Trust must
be from a minority class); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 226.900, 226.905, 226.907, 226.910 (1994)
(deleting in its entirety the provisions relating to minority business participation in state
transportation contracts); Mo. REV. STAT. § 238.305 (1994) (deleting references to the
employment of minorities and women in public corporations' business plans); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 313.270 (1994) (deleting the references to a minimum level of minority business participation
in state lottery contracts); Mo. REV. STAT. § 620.605 (1994) (revising the policy of promoting
the perpetuation of existing minority businesses as one of assisting minority businesses to
compete); Mo. REV. STAT. § 643.310 (1994) (deleting the requirement that the Minority
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convincing evidence that:
1) Specific, pervasive and systematic discrimination has
occurred in the past and will continue to occur in the future; 2)
The executive order, policy or rule is a narrowly tailored
remedial action that furthers a compelling governmental
interest; and 3) The remedial action shall sunset when
discrimination is eliminated but no later than two years after
implementation.16
The Bill takes another important step. As outright preferences
become more difficult to pass in popularly elected legislatures,
preferences are more likely to be created by rules, executive orders,
or other means which do not require approval by legislatures.' 7 For
example, to avoid public scrutiny, universities have traditionally
exercised preference policies that are not specifically stated in any
rule.'8 Such a policy is the subject of a lawsuit pending against the
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Mo. Exec. Order No. 94-03 (1994). Executive Order 94-03 mandates that the
State Office of Equal Employment Opportunity monitor all departments of the executive branch
of state government and assist them to ensure equal employment opportunity and affirmative
action. This Order also created an affirmative action council that is composed of members of
each executive department who serve as liaisons to their director's office. In the area of state
contracts, the Order requires that the State work toward the goal of awarding at least 5% of the
Executive branch contracts to minority-owned or controlled businesses.
18. In 1996, after the Fifth Circuit decided the case of Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932
(5th Cir. 1996), the Commissioner of the Missouri Coordinating Board for Higher Education,
while testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee, was asked what impact the
Hopwood decision would have on affirmative action programs in the state of Missouri. She
indicated that all such programs were "under review" by legal counsel. Testimony by Kala
Stroup, Commissioner of the Missouri Coordinating Board for Higher Education, in Jefferson
City, Mo. (Feb. 1996).
During the preparation of this Article, letters were sent to each of the public four-year
colleges and universities in Missouri, asking them about their racial quotas and affirmative
action programs. Their responses were as follows:
I. Institutions that reported they have no racial-quota policy: I) Central Missouri
State University; 2) Missouri Southern State College; 3) Missouri Western State
College; 4) Northwest Missouri State University; 5) Southeast Missouri State
University; 6) Southwest Missouri State University; 7) Truman State University;
8) University of Missouri-Kansas City; 9) University of Missouri-Columbia; 10)
University of Missouri-Rolla; and 11) University of Missouri-St. Louis.
II. Institutions that reported they have no affirmative action policy: 1) Central
Missouri State University; 2) Missouri Southern State College; 3) Missouri
Western State College; 4) Northwest Missouri State University; 5) Southeast
1998]
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University of Michigan that was filed by a white female student who
believes that she was rejected for admission by the University to
make room for minority students who allegedly possess academic
qualifications lower than her own.19 The suit is based on confidential
University of Michigan documents obtained20 through the Freedom
of Information Act.21 The documents show the ways in which the
University uses race in deciding who is admitted to its freshman
class .2
To eliminate such preference practices in Missouri, the "proposed
committee substitute"2 for Senate Bill 681 contains a provision that
requires that all policies regarding preferences and admissions be
promulgated by rule and subject to the normal rule making process of
Chapter 536 of Missouri Revised Statutes.24 Section 536.021(8)
allows a litigant to challenge any procedure that is not properly
promulgated and to receive attorneys' fees if the court finds that a
policy should have been promulgated as a rule.
Missouri State University; 6) University of Missouri-Kansas City; 7) University of
Missouri-Columbia; 8) University of Missouri-Rolla; 9) University of Missouri-
St. Louis.
l1. Institutions that reported they have an affirmative action policy: 1) Southwest
Missouri State University (goal: 7% minority enrollment) and 2) Truman State
University (goal: 10% minority enrollment) (in their publication entitled Affirming
the Promise, Truman State lists a 10% minority enrollment goal, but in their letter
addressed to this Author, they ironically reported having no affirmative action
policy).
19. For example, the documents suggest that a white student with an SAT score of 1000
and a GPA of 3.2 should not be admitted and that an African-American or Hispanic applicant
with the same scores should be admitted. See Rene Sanchez, Final Exam for Campus
Affirmative Action?, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 1997, at Al; see also Terry Carter, On A Roll(back),
ABA J., Feb. 1998, at 54.
20. Professor Carl Cohen, one of the contributors to this Symposium, is the individual
who obtained the University's documents.
21. See Sanchez, supra note 19, at Al.
22. See id.
23. In the Missouri Senate, bill substitutes can be offered in committee or on the floor of
the Senate. This mechanism affords senators the opportunity to make multiple amendments to a
filed bill and have them accepted in one vote rather than requiring a vote on each individual
amendment.
24. See Proposed Senate Committee Substitute for S. 681, 89th Mo. Leg., 2nd Sess.
(1998). Section 536.018 of Missouri Revised Statutes exempts institutions of higher education
from the definition of"state agency." See Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.018 (1994).
25. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.021(8) (1994). Section 172.360 of Missouri Revised
Statutes requires "that each applicant for admission ... [to a University of Missouri institution]
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III. THE COURTS AND RACIAL PREFERENCE
The language of Senate Bill 681, setting out the conditions for the
enactment of preferences, is taken directly from the U.S. Supreme
Court case of City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., in which the
Court found that the Fourteenth Amendment requires strict scrutiny
of all race-based action taken by state and local governments.26
Before any race-based classification can be used, there must be a
finding that there was, in fact, discrimination and that the program to
remedy that discrimination is narrowly tailored to remedy the effects
of the discrimination.27
However, a year after Croson, the Supreme Court, in Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, upheld two federal race-based policies
against a Fifth Amendment challenge. 28 The Metro Broadcasting
Court held that congressionally mandated "benign" racial
classifications need only satisfy intermediate scrutiny.29 It thus
appeared that the Supreme Court might be inclined to impose a lesser
duty on the federal government than on the states in the area of equal
protection.30 It became clear that this was not the case with the
Court's decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.31 Justice
O'Connor, writing for the Court's majority, held that "all racial
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under
strict scrutiny.,
32
shall possess such scholastic attainment and mental and moral qualifications as shall be
prescribed in rules adopted by the Board of Curators." Mo. REV. STAT. § 172.360 (1994). It is
unclear from the language and legislative history of section 172.360 whether the statute requires
that the Board of Curators adopt one set of rules that applies to every University of Missouri
applicant. It appears to have been intended as a ban on preferential treatment of certain students,
possibly the children of wealthy alumni or the politically connected.
26. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 227,469 (1989).
27. See id.
28. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
29. See id. at 564.
30. See id.
31. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
32. Id. at 227. The racial classification at issue in Adarand was a federal set-aside for a
Hispanic-owned guardrail company in Colorado that effectively prevented the only Colorado
guardrail company owned by a white male from placing bids on contracts. See id. at 204-07.
The court emphasized that judges should examine "benign" racial classifications just as
skeptically as malignant classifications. See id. at 226-27. At the same time, the court suggested
1998]
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The Adarand Court's silence about the fate of the Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke33 case was especially conspicuous.
In the Court's landmark 1978 Bakke opinion, Justice Lewis Powell
had held that education is different than other spheres of state action
and, thus, found that public universities are more free to resort to
racial preferences than other state actors. 34 The Bakke Court
concluded that race could be a factor in admission decisions but not
the factor in granting admission.
3 5
However, the Adarand Court's silence on the modem applicability
of Bakke has left open the question of whether race can still be used
as a deciding factor in university admissions. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected the proposition that race can
be considered as a factor in admission decisions in the recent case of
Hopwood v. Texas.36 In Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit struck down the
racial preference program adopted by the University of Texas Law
School and ordered the University's officials to adopt a color-blind
admissions process. 37 The United States Supreme Court declined to
review the case,38 and, thus, Hopwood remains the law in Texas,
Louisiana, and Mississippi.
In Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit suggested that, in the wake of
Adarand, the use of race to achieve a diverse student body cannot be
a state interest sufficiently compelling to meet the high standard of
strict scrutiny.39 According to the Fifth Circuit, Adarand, not Bakke,
is the law of the land when it comes to racial preferences in higher
education.4°
that affirmative action programs might be narrowly tailored as a response to the "unhappy
persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against
minority groups in this country.... Id. at 237.
33. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
34. See id. at 287.
35. See id. at 307.
36. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
37. See id.
38. See 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
39. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 940.
40. In Bakke, Justice Powell had held otherwise. According to Powell, state universities
could take race into account in admissions decisions to achieve the benefits of diversity or as a
remedy for past discrimination. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12. The Hopwood court believed
Powell spoke only for himself and not for the majority of the Supreme Court: "Justice Powell's
argument in Bakke garnered only his own vote and has never represented the view of a majority
[Vol. 54:93
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Critics of the Fifth Circuit's Hopwood decision disagree with this
conclusion,41 pointing out that the court overlooked Part V-C of
Powell's opinion in Bakke.42 Part V-C of Powell's opinion, joined by
four other Justices,43 held that, "In enjoining [the University of
California at Davis] from ever considering the race of any applicant
... , the courts below failed to recognize that the State has a
substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a properly
devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration
of race and ethnic origin.""
The Supreme Court's decision to not review the Hopwood case
has left unresolved the issue of whether educational institutions can
use racial preferences in granting college admission. On the current
Supreme Court, at most four justices-Antonin Scalia, Clarence
Thomas and, far more tentatively, William Rehnquist and Anthony
Kennedy-have committed themselves to the proposition that the
Constitution is color-blind in all circumstances. 45 Four justices-
Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David Souter and John Paul
Stevens-have strongly hinted that they would, in the case of
education at least, accept forward-looking justifications for
affirmative action, such as diversity, as well as backward-looking
justifications, such as racial compensation.46 Thus, the future of
Bakke, and of affirmative action itself, appears to rest with the
remaining justice, Sandra Day O'Connor.47
We still do not know how the Court will decide the issue of racial
of the Court in Bakke or any other case." Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 941. The Hopwood court also
stated its belief that Powell's opinion that achieving diversity in higher education was a
constitutionally compelling interest would not gain a majority of votes on the Supreme Court
today. See id.
41. See, e.g., Leslie Yalof Garfield, Hopwood v. Texas: Strict in Theory or Fatal in Fact,
34 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 497, 518 (1997); Erin M. Hardtke, Elimination ofRace as a Factor in
Law School Admissions: An Analysis of Hopwood v. Texas, 80 MARQ. L. REv. 1136, 1152
(1997).
42. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320.
43. In addition to Justice Powell, Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun
concurred in this part of the opinion. See id.
44. Id.at321.
45. See Richard D. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1037,
1043 (1996).
46. See id.; see also Jeffrey Rosen, The Day the Quotas Died, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr.
22, 1996.
47. See Kahlenberg, supra note 45, at 1041.
1998]
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preferences in education, and there remains a question of whether
diversity is a compelling "governmental interest. ' '48 The issue could
have been clarified when the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case
of Taxman v. Board of Education.49 In Taxman, a white school
teacher was laid off at the request of a school board.50 The board fired
the white teacher in favor of an African-American teacher because
the board wanted there to be greater "diversity" in the high school's
business-education department. 51 The case settled at the eleventh
hour, however, when a consortium of civil rights groups raised the
money to pay off the claims of Ms. Taxman and the fees of her
lawyer.5 2 Therefore, the Supreme Court was prevented from hearing
the case, as the settlement rendered the controversy non-justiciable.53
Apparently, the civil rights groups did not want the Supreme Court to
hear the case because they were afraid that the Supreme Court would
rule against the school board and thereby establish a precedent that
would damage the cause of racial preferences.54
The Supreme Court was recently given another opportunity to rule
on racial preferences in University and Community College System v.
Farmer.55 In Farmer, the Nevada Supreme Court upheld the
University of Nevada's decision to hire a black male immigrant from
Uganda instead of an equally qualified white female applicant.56 The
University's defense to the female's claim of sex discrimination was
to insist that its hiring decision was motivated solely by race and,
thus, was justified by the university's desire for diversity.57 However,
such motives do not meet the standard of Adarand which requires
that discrimination remedies be narrowly tailored to address specific
past or ongoing discrimination.58 Nevertheless, the United States
48. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,237 (1995).
49. 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997), cert. dismissed,
118 S. Ct. 595 (1997).
50. Seeid.at 1551.
51. See Id.
52. See Roger Clegg, Nevada Offers Supreme Court Another Piscataway, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 19, 1998, atA15.
53. See U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2, cl. 1.
54. See Clegg, supra note 52, at Al5.
55. 930 P.2d 730 (Nev. 1997).
56. See id. at 733.
57. See id.
58. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 200.
[Vol. 54:93
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Supreme Court declined to hear the case.59 Critics of the Nevada
Supreme Court's decision have questioned, "How plausible is it that
the university is making up for the wrongs suffered by victims of
American slavery and the Jim Crow era by hiring a sociologist from
Uganda?" 6 The United States Supreme Court's decision not to hear
the case leaves this question unanswered.
Missouri Senate bill 681 seeks to eliminate from Missouri law any
unconstitutional provisions dealing with racial preferences. Senate
Bill 681 is specifically concerned with the unconstitutional provisions
of Revised Missouri Statute sections 161.415, dealing with minority
teaching scholarships, and 640.240, dealing with the minority and
environmental literacy program.61  The Minority Teachings
Scholarships are available to minority students for the purpose of
encouraging minority students to enter teaching.62 To be eligible for
the scholarship, a minority student must be a resident of the state of
Missouri, make a commitment to pursue a teacher education program
approved by the Department of Elementary and Secondary
Education, and commit to teaching science or mathematics.63
Additionally, the student must achieve a score on a college admission
test that ranks in the top quarter, and the student must also rank in the
top quarter of his or her high school class.
64
Similarly, the Minority and Under-Represented Environmental
Literacy Program awards scholarships to minority and under-
represented students to pursue environmentally related courses of
study.65 The program requires that those ethnic groups that are most
severely under-represented, as determined by data gathered and
maintained by the National Academy of Sciences, receive priority in
59. See 118 S. Ct. 1186(1998).
60. Clegg, supra note 52, at A15.
61. See S. 681, 89th Mo. Leg., 2d Sess. (1998).
62. See MO. REV. STAT. § 161.415 (1994).
63. See id.
64. See id. For Fiscal Year 1999, Missouri Governor Mel Camahan asked that $449,000
be appropriated to fund this scholarship program. See H. 1002, 89th Mo. Leg., 2d Sess. (1998).
65. See MO. REV. STAT. § 640.240 (1994). The Minority and Under-Represented
Environmental Literacy Program was passed in Senate Bill No. 805 in 1996. The vote in the
Missouri Senate was twenty-four "yeas" (18 Democrats and 6 Republicans) and nine "nays" (I
Democrat and 8 Republicans). The vote in the House was 96 "yeas" and 60 "nays" with a party
breakdown similar to that in the Senate. See SENATE JOURNAL, 88th Mo. Leg., 2d Sess. (May 2,
1996); HOUSE JOURNAL, 88th Mo. Leg., 2d Session (May 17, 1996).
1998]
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annual selection.66
The above review of racial preference case law makes it clear that
Missouri Senate Bill 681, in effect, asks the Missouri General
Assembly to put language into the Missouri Statutes that, according
to the Supreme Court's decision in Adarand, is already the law of the
land with regard to contracting and employment.67 Some question
may still remain as to whether Adarand and, thus, the language in
Senate Bill 681, is also the law with regard to educational issues.
Here again, however, the relevant case law suggests that when the
Supreme Court rules on this issue, Adarand will control. 68
Even if we assume that Bakke, rather than Adarand, controls in
the area of education, the above-referenced Minority Teaching
Scholarships and Minority and Under-Represented Environmental
Literacy Program are unconstitutional. While Bakke never specified
the point at which a benign "plus" factor becomes a malignant
"decisive" factor, the Supreme Court's decision did stress that the
search for racial diversity should not "insulate" minority candidates
from "competitive consideration" at the expense of white candidates
who might bring to the relevant forum diverse perspectives of their
own. 69 Accordingly, Bakke stands for the proposition that race may
be a factor, but not the factor, in granting a racial preference.70
In the case of Podberesky v. Kirwan,71 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the University of Maryland at
College Park could not maintain a separate merit scholarship program
for which only African-Americans were eligible. 2 The issue before
the court was whether there was a present effect of past
discrimination sufficient to justify the program.73 The court found
that there was not.74 The court found that the past discrimination was
66. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 640.240. For Fiscal Year 1999, Missouri Governor Mel
Carnahan asked that $50,000 be appropriated to fund this scholarship program. See H. 1006,
89th Mo. Leg., 2d Seass. (1998).
67. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
68. SeeAdarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
69. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317.
70. See id. at 307.
71. 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994).
72. See id. at 152.
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the result of general societal actions, which cannot be used as a basis
for supporting a race-conscious remedy." The court also looked at
the under-representation of African-Americans in the University and
decided that "High achievers, whether African American or not, are
not the groups against which the University discriminated in the
past."76
Like the program that the Fourth Circuit found to be
unconstitutional in Poberesky, the Missouri minority scholarship
programs require that one be a minority to qualify, and neither of the
scholarship programs are available to all minority students. Thus, it is
clear that the educational scholarship programs, which would be
eliminated as a result of Senate Bill 681, would probably all fail if
challenged in court. Accordingly, Senate Bill 681 simply does
legislatively what a court could do judicially. Senate Bill 681 remains
necessary, however, because non-minority students do not usually
find that it is worthwhile to go to court over these matters and have
such programs declared unconstitutional. As one commentator has
observed, "Great Supreme Court decisions, for all their theatricality,
are notoriously weak engines of social change. The commands of
Brown v. Board of Education weren't implemented until decades
later.",77 It could take equally long for every remnant of racial
preference to be purged from the law. Legislation such as Senate Bill
681, however, would greatly expedite the remedial process.
Senate Bill 681, if adopted as law, would also reverse the burden
of proof on issues of constitutionality. Today, questionable programs
continue until their opponents prove in court that the programs do not
meet constitutional requirements.78 Under Senate Bill 681, however,
the agencies that want racial preferences will bear the burden of
establishing that their programs meet all relevant constitutional
75. See id. at 155.
76. Id. at 158.
77. Rosen, supra note 46.
78. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.071 (1994). This statute requires judges, in deciding
whether to certify juveniles as adults, to consider "racial disparities in certifications" in making
their decisions. It will continue to be impossible to make a finding that discrimination exists
with regard to juvenile certification, in the absence of the enactment of Senate Bill 681, because
all juvenile records are closed, making documentation of actual discrimination impossible.
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requirements.79 Taxpayers will have standing to bring suit to
challenge the findings and receive attorneys' fees if they are
successful. 80
In the Adarand case, Justice Clarence Thomas stated, "There can
be no doubt that racial paternalism and its unintended consequences
can be as poisonous and pernicious as any other form of
discrimination." 81 One must question the motives of legislators who
are unwilling to take the language from Supreme Court case law and
put it in the statutes. Are they simply willing to ignore the
Constitution to pursue the chimera of racial diversity, or,
alternatively, do they simply wish to perpetuate the "racial spoils
systems" 82 for their political gain?
79. See S. 681.
80. See id.
81. Adarand, 515 U.S. at236.
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